JACKSON vs. THE Y. & C. RAILROAD CO.

Supreme Court of Maine.
JACKSON vs. THE Y.

& C.

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Without some statutory provision, no action can be maintained in the name of an
assignee, upon interest coupons, which contaiti no negotiable words, nor
language from which it can be inferred, that it was the design of the corporation issuing them, to treat them as negotiable paper, or as creating an obligation distinct from, and independent of, the bonds to which they were severally
attached when the bonds were issued.
The negotiability of such coupons is a question of law, to be determined, frim the
papers themselves, by fixed and well-settled rules; and proof- of custom, as to
the negotiability of them, is inadmissible.
The bonds being specialties, the remedy for breaches thereof, is by an action, not
of assumpsit, but of debt or of covenant broken; not being legally assignable,
.no action is maintainable in the name of the holder, though he be assignee.
GOODENOW, J., dissenting.
It is indispensable to its maintenance that the cause of action exist at the time the
action was commenced. The statute of 1856, c. 248, does not remedy this defect.

This case was reported in full in the August number of the
p. 585, to which we refer the reader. In the
following supplemental note, several decisions of great interest
and importance are added.
LAW REGISTER,

ADDENDU3.-Sinice preparing the note

to the above case, we have discovered a
considerable number of cases bearing
upon the questions before discussed, of
the existence of which we either were
not aware, or else the fact had escaped
present recollection. In Beaver Co. vs.
Armstrong, Sup. Ct. Penna., February
1863, a learned and elaborate decision
was delivered by Mr. Justice READ, in
which the cases bearing upon the question were thoroughly reviewed, and the
conclusion arrived at, that the coupons
of railroad bonds are negotiable ingtruments, and may be sued by the holder

separate from the bonds, and interest
recovered from the date of the demand
and refusal. This very point was also
decided in Knox Co. vs. Aspinwall, 21
How. U. S. R. 539; and seems to have
been recognised in Zabriskie vs. C. C.
& C. Railway, 23 How. U. S. R. 381,
400. This affords very satisfa6tory confirmation of the views already expressed
by us, and can scarcely fail to convince
the Court in Maine, that the present
weight of American authority' is very
decidedly in favor of the views maintained by Mr. Justice GOOnDEOW.
I. F. R.

IN RE JORDAN.1

Supreme Court oft New York.
IN TfE MATTER OF WILLIAM S. JORDAN;

SAME OF JOSEPH ECK;

SAME OF JOHN HEDGES.
1. Where. on a return to a writ of habeas corpus, a state Judge or Court isjudicialy
apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States,
such Judge or Court can proceed no further.

The prisoner is then within the

dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
2. Under the second section of chapter 24 of the Laws of Congress of 1862, it is
declared that "hereafter

no person under the age of eighteen years shall be

mustered into the United States service, and the oath of enlistment taken by
the recruit shall be conclusive as to his age."

The prisoner having been

mustered into the United States service, and having, at the time of enlistment,
made a declaration under oath that he was twenty-one years of age, and these
facts'having been stated in the return to tie writ of hibeaa corpus by the party
claiming to hold him in custody under color of the authority of the United
States

Held, that the state Judge was "judicially apprised" that the prisoner

was in custody under the authority of the United States, and thLt he was ousted
of his jurisdiction.
3. The case of Ableman vs. Booth, 21 How. U. S. 506, approved and followed.

At Chambers, August 8, 1863, before E.
Judge, &c.

DARWIN

SMITH,

Cases of hiabeas corpus. Thefacts appear in the opinion.
C. Nash and G. Parker, for petitioners.
Job Hedges, for respondents.
E. DARWIN SMITH, J.-In
these three cases writs of habeas
corpus had been issued returnable, and coming on to be heard upon
the returns thereto together, on the 8th of August, instant. After
argument, I dismissed the proceedings for reasons then stated
orally, but as these applications are quite frequent, I thought it
would be useful to state my reasons for such decision, and the
principles governing the allowance of writs of habeas corpus more
formally, and announced at the time that I should do so at my
earliest convenience.
These writs of habeas corpus were respectively allowed upon the

IN RE JORDAN.

allegation that the parties whose imprisonment was complained of,
were minors under the age of eighteen years, and were unlawfully
held and restrained of their liberty by military officers, on the
pretence that they were duly enlisted as soldiers into the service
of the United States.
When the writs were allowed, I intimated to'the parties applying for them, that I thought they would be unavailing, but I could
not refuse to allow them.
According to the Habeas Corpus Act of this State, the Judges
of this Court and other State Judges authorized to entertain proceedings under the act, and to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of any person restrained of his liberty within the State,
have no discrgtion in respect to the allowance of such writs, if pe-titions are presented to them for that purpose in the form prescribed by the statute. The petitions in these three cases were in
such form.
It has been held in some of the States, that it is not the duty
of the Judge or Court applied to for the allowance of a writ of
habeas corpus, to allow the same if he is satisfied upon the petition
and commitment annexed that it will be their duty to remand the
prisoner.
In the case of Passmore 'Williamson, 3 Am. Law Register 741,
Chief Justice LEWIS, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, so
held and refused the writ, and the Supreme Court of that State,
in the same case, on an application to the Court for the writ, so
held: 26 Penn. R. (2 Casey) 9.
Whether the Habeas Corpus Act of Pennsylvania is the same as
the statute in this State, I am not apprised; but, under this decision, as it is the decision of the highest Court in that State, it
would doubtless be entirely safe and proper for any Judge in that
State to refuse the writ when, upon the face of the papers, he was
of the opinion that it ought not to be granted, for the above-menrioned reasons. But the statute of this State prescribes a different
rule. Its language is as follows: "Any Court or officer empowered to grant any writ applied for, &c., to whom such petition
shall be presented, shall grant such writ .vithout delay :" sect. 40,
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2d Rev. Stat. p. 564; and sect. 46 is as follows: -If any Court
or officer authorized by the provisions of this article to grant writs
of habea8,corpus or certiorarishall refuse to grant such writ, when
legally applied for, every member of such Court who shall have
assented to such refusal, and every such officer, shall severally forfeit to the parties aggrieved one thousand dollars."
I think it was the intention of the Legislature in these provisions to preclude any pretence for delay or evasion in granting the
writ, for the double purpose of providing for a prompt examination
in all cases of the grounds of imprisonment of any person restrained
of his liberty; and of having such examination in such form as to
allow a record to be made up for review in a superior tribunal,
that no man should be concluded by the decision of any single
Judge upon the question of the legality of his imprisonment.
Upon the return of the writs issued in these cases, the persons
upon whom the same were served having omitted and refused to
obey the same by producing the party named in such writs respectively, claimed to be excused from such neglect or refusal, upon
returns in each of said cases similar to that made in the case of
Jordan, which is in substance as follows:
1st. That the person making such returns upon whom such writ
was served was a military officer in the service of the United
States, at Rochester, and engaged in organizing a regiment of
volunteers in such service.
2d. That said Jordan, the party named in said writ, was detained
as an enlisted soldier in the service of the United States, and was
so detained and held at the time of the service of haid.writ.
8d. That the production of said Jordan would be inconsistent
with and in violation of his duty as a military officer under the
orders of his superior officer.
4th. That the said Jordan is held under the authority of the
United States, and for this reason, and without intending any disrespect to the honorable Judge who issued the process, the said
returning officer declined to produce said Jordan or to subject him
to the process of the Court.
This return I held and consider insufficient. The person upon

IN BE JORDAN.

whom a writ of habeas corpus is served must obey the writ by producing the body and making return of the cause of the impressment br detention, or show a -suicient excuse for such refusal or
neglect." This return was obviously made to present such excuse.
If no sufficient excuse is shown, the Judge must issue an attachment against the party refusing to produce the body, which was
moved for in these cases, and which I held must issue unless the
returns were amended.
It is the duty which State Courts owe to the citizens of the
State, to see to it, when their judicial powers are invoked for that
purpose, that no one is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty. Every citizen of adult age has the absolute right to be
free from any restraint upon his person, and any person claiming
a right to exercise restraint over another must, when questioned
in respect to the exercise of such power by judicial proceedings,
show a lawful ground or authority for such restraint. He must
show that it is under -color of law and of an apparent legal right.
The petition in each of these cases states that the party restrained of his liberty was an infant under the age of eighteen
years. In the second section of an Act of Congress, chapter 25,
passed February 13, 1862, it is declared as follows: "That hereafter no person under the age of eighteen years shall be mustered
into the United States service, and the oath of enlistment taken
by the recruit shall be conclusive as to his age."
Assuming the facts of the petitions to be true, the return in
these cases shows no apparent right to hold Jordan and the other
parties in question as enlisted soldiers in the United States service.
These returns were doubtless made under the authority of the
case of Ableman vs. Booth, 21 How. U. S. 506, in which Judge
TANEY used the language following: "But after the return is
made, and the State Judge or Court judicially apprised that the
party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they
can proceed no further."
The State Judge, in my opinion, cannot be judicially apprised
that the party is in custody under the authority of the United
States, until, by a proper return, the facts are stated or presented
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for his consideration, which, upon their face, show a case of apparent lawful detention or imprisonment under the authority of the
United States. The mere general assertion as made in the return
in these cases that the parties were held under the authority of
the United States is not sufficient. Almost any wrong or outrage
might be covered up by such a return. It would substitute a military, or ministerial, or other officer of the General Government, or
any private person claiming to act in its behalf in the ,place of the
Judiciary Department, to judge of the character and rightfulness
of his authority. This clearly cannot be allowed. Every person
is amenable to the law of the land, as interpreted by the Courts,
State or National.
In accordance with these views and upon leave granted, the respondents in these several cases amended their returns as follows
respectively:
" 5th. That the said Jordan was regularly enlisted into the service of the United States; according to the rules and regulations
of the recruiting service for enlisting volunteers, by his signing
the paper, statement, or declaration directed for recruits to sign,
and by his taking the oath required for recruits to take; and that
the paper hereto annexed, marked A, is one of the triplicate enlistments in this case; that the oath was regularly.administered
by an officer authorized to administer oaths, and that he was regularly examined by the surgeon appointed for that purpose."
DECLARATION Or RECRUIT.
I, James Jordan, desiring to volunteer as a soldier in the army of the United
States, for the term of three years, do declare that I am twenty-one years and
months of age; that I have never been discharged from the United States
service on account of disability or by sentence of a court-martial, or by order
before the expiration of a term of enlistment; and I know of no impediment to

my serving honestly and faithfully as a soldier for three years.
Given at Rochester, N. Y., the 4th day of July, 1863.
Witness: F. WARNER.

JAmEs JORDAx.

VOLUNTEER E ;LIST MNT.
STATE Or NEW YoRK,
CiTy or RocesTER .
I, James Jordan, born in the town of Pittsford, in the State of New York, aged
VoL. XI.-48
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twenty-one years, and by occupation a farmer, do hereby acknowledge to have
Tolunteered this fourth day of July, 1863, to serve as a soldier in the army of the
United States of America, for the period of three years, unless sooner discharged
by proper authority; do also agree to accept such bounty, pay, rations, and
clothing, as are, or may be, established by law for volunteers. And I, James
Jordan, do solemnly swear, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Unitedl
States of America, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all!
the I
their enemies or opposers whomsoever; and that I will observe and obey
orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers appointed
over me, according to the Rules and Articles of War.

-

JAMES JORDAN.

Sworn and subscribed to, at Rochester, this 4th day of July, 1863, before J. M.
Bardwell, Commissioner of Deeds.
I certify, on honor, that I have carefully examined the above-named volunteer,
agreeably to the General Regulations of the Army, and that in my opinion he is
free from all bodily defects and mental infirmity, which would, in any way, disqualify him from performing the duties of a soldier.
I. MULLEN,
Surgeon 13th N. Y. V. Artillery, Examining Surgeon.
I certify, on honor, that I have minutely inspected the volunteer, previously to
his enlistment, and that he was entirely sober when enlisted; that, to the best of
my judgment and belief, he is of lawful age; and that, in accepting him us duly
qualified to perform the duties of. an able-bodied soldier, I have strictly observed
the Regulations which govern the recruiting service. This soldier has blue eyes,
brown hair, light complexion, is five feet eight inches high.
JOuN WEED,

Captain 13th Regiment of N. Y. Artillery Vols.,
Recruiting Officer.

-

The return of the respondents in these cases, thus amended, I
held and consider, presented a case of imprisonment under the
authority of the United States-prima facie, lawful. Upon the
face of these enlistment papers, the United States officers authorized to make enlistments were clearly entitled to receive the enlistment of the said Jordan, and to muster him into the United
States service. He distinctly declares that he is twenty-one years
of age, and in the recital to the oath reasserts this declaration,
and, for aught that appears, on the face of these papers, he was
lawfully enlisted, and is legally held as a soldier in the volunteer
service. As the office of the writ of habeas corpus under the statute is primarily to discharge the party from unlawful imprisonment, this recruit himself cannot be discharged under this writ,
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because he is not unlawfully restrained of his liberty. He has
voluntarily enlisted and subjected himself to the restraint of military rule. He is not restrained against his will, but with his
express consent.
. Bat it was urged that the petitioner, the father of the prisoner,
is not concluded by these enlistment papers, but may controvert
the same, and show that the enlistment was not valid, for the reason
and upon the. ground that his son was, in fact, at the time of his
enlistment, under the age of eighteen years. And the petitioner
claimed the right to traverse the return, and show this fact.
On the contrary, it was insisted by the respondent that the return ousts me of jurisdiction, and that I must dismiss the proceedings under the authority of the case of Ableman vs. Booth. This
presents a point of great delicacy, and of much public importance.
The question whether the Judges of the State Courts have
jurisdiction in this class of cases, when it distinctly appears that the
petitioner, or person in whose behalf the writ is applied for, is held
under the authority of the United States, has been much discussed
in the State Courts. In this State, an application for a writ of
habeas corpus to the Supreme Court, for the discharge of a soldier
enlisting, &c., was made in 1799, in the case of ffusted, vide
Johns. Cases 136, where it was denied-two of the Judges saying
if the facts stated were returned to the habeas corpus it would be
conclusive against his discharge, and one said the motion ought to
be denied because the Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and
the two other Judges were in favor of allowing the writ.
During the war of 1812, a like application was made to the
Court in the ease of Ferguson, 9 Johns. 298, when the writ was
denied. This was an application by the father, and the affidavits
state his son's age to be seventeen years. In. this case, Judge
KENT, in a very careful opinion, held that the State Courts had not
jurisdiction of the case. He said: " The present case being one
of an enlistment under color of authority of the United States,
and by an officer of that government, the Federal Courts have
complete jurisdiction in the case ;" and he said further, "cto interfere would be exercising power without any jurisdiction."
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The other Judges all concurred in denying the writ, on the
ground that the Judges of the United States Courts, having complete jurisdiction of the case, the application ought to be made to
that Court.
This Court has however since in several instances claimed and
exercised jurisdiction in such cases. It did so in the case of Carlton, 7 Cow. 471; following several cases ,in the Massachusetts
Courts; and also assumed the right to exerqise it in the case of
Wyngall, 5 Hill 16.
In neither of these cases was the question discussed by counsel
or by the Court. The case of Carlton arose upon a submission of
the point to the Court by the Recorder of New York, who had
exercised jurisdiction in the case of a soldier held at West Point.
No opinion was written by the Court.: The Chief Justice, in brief
terms, affirmed the jurisdiction of the Recorder in such cases. In
the case of W yngall, 5 Hill, a Supreme Court Commissioner had
exercised jurisdiction in such a case, and discharged a soldier
enlisted, &c., on the ground that he was an alien. The Court reversed the decision, but did not discuss the question of jurisdiction.
Under these cases, I think the Judges of this Court would have
generally claimed and exercised jurisdiction in such cases, as such
jurisdiction has been exercised in many of the other State Courts
before the decision in the case of Ableman vs. Booth.
This is a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, whose
decisions upon questions arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States are conclusive authority upon all State and
inferior. Courts.
In this case, it is conceded, in the opinion of Judge TANEY, that
the State Judges may issue the writ of habeas-corpus upon a
proper application showing an illegal restraint, and inquire in this
mode of proceeding by what authority and for what caiise any
party is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within the territorial limits of the State sovereignty; and he holds also that it is
the duty of the marshal, or other person having the custody of the
prisoner, to make known to the Judge or Court by a proper return
the authority by which he holds him in custody.
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He says: "But after the return is made, and the State Judge
or Court judicially apprised that the party is in custody UNDER
THE AUTHORITY OR THE UNITED STATES, they can proceed no further. They THEN 'know that the prisoner is within the dominion
and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the writ
of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties.
He is then within the dominion and EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the
United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws,
their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, THEIR judicial tribunals can release him and afford him
redress."
This case, in its-facts, is not precisely the same as the cases
under consideration. It presents a case where the writ of habeas
corpus was used to wrest from a United States marshal a prisoner
held under judicial process from a United States Commissioner,
and also in effect to review and annul the decision and judgment
of a United States District Court upon the trial and indictment
for an offence under a law of Congress, on the ground that the
law was unconstitutional. A more palpable perversion of the writ
could hardly be imagined.
But this case of Ableman vs. Booth, in principle,covers the cases
in hand, I think, very clearly and conclusively.
The theory of our Government, asserted in this able opinion of
Chief Justice TANEY, which was obviously prepared with great
care and deliberation, and received the assent of all his brethren
upon the bench in the year 1858, consisting of Associate Justiceb
M CEAN, WAYNE, CATRON, DANIEL, NELSON, GRIER, CAMPBELL,

and CLIFFORD, is that the powers of government in this country
are divided between, and are intrusted to, two distinct sovereignties
-the National and State Governments; that each in its particular
sphere is independent, exclusive, and supreme. That each of these
sovereignties has its particular executive legislative and judiciary
departments. That each of these departments of government is
limited to its particular sovereignty, and that neither the National
Government nor the State Governments can authorize its Courts
to exercise judicial power within the jurisdiction of the other
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sovereignty. That in this particular they stand to each other in
the relation of independent governments.
Judge TANEY says : "The power of the General. Government
and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the
same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties,
acting separately and independently of each other within their
respective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the
United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process
issued by a State Judge in a State Court as if the line of division
was traced by landmarks and measurements visible to the eye.
And the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these
proceedings of its Judge and Courts than it would have had if the
prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other State of
the Union, for an offence against the laws of the State in which
he was imprisoned."
Upon this theory every citizen owes to his country a divided
duty-to the National. Government be owes allegiance and the
duty of submission and obedience to its laws, and to the State
Government, obedience and submission to its laws; each in the
proper sphere. Within the sphere of the National Government,
its Judiciary protects his rights and vindicates his wrongs; .and
within the sphere of the State Government, its Judiciary enforces
his duties, protects his rights, and gives redress for the injuries he
may receive in person or property.
When the citizen whose normal condition is under the State
Governments, passes the boundary which separates the State and
National sovereignties, lie subjects himself to the judicial power
of the National Government, which is entitled to interpret and
enforce the law of its sovereignty exclusively, except in such particulars as under the Constitution of the United States, the State
and National Judiciary possess concurrent jurisdiction. Such is
the clear doctrine of this case.
It proceeds from a Court. which, by the Constitution of the
United States, is entitled to decide and finally determine all questions and controversies relating to the respective powers of the
United States and the States.
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If I doubted in respect to its correctness, it would be my duty,
nevertheless, to acquiesce in and submit to it as the authoritative
exposition of the law governing the cases under consideration.
But it seems to me that the doctrine asserted in this case of
Ableman vs. Booth is very essential to the maintenance of the
national authority, especially in a time of war. No government
could maintain and exercise its powers in their full vigor when its
acts could be controlled by the Judiciary of another sovereignty,
or by a Judiciary owing its appointment and authority to another
government. If every act of the General Government affecting
the personal liberty of the citizen can be overhauled upon habeas
corpus by the Judges of the State Courts, incalculable embarrassments and mischief might be the inevitable result.
Judge LowRIEi in his able opinion in the Passmore Williamson
case; supra, says, in respect to such mischief: c Any man arrested
or imprisoned by warrant, or execution, or sentence from District,
Circuit, or Supreme Courts, or either House of Congress, might
have relief from any friendly county Judge wielding the power of
habeas corpus.
"A Judge impeached, convicted, and sentenced-a traitor tried
and condemned, may still have hope from the habeas corpus, if a
Judge can be found ignorant or insubordinate or degraded enough
to declare that his superiors acted without jurisdiction."
The present condition of this country illustrates much more
than in times of peace the importance and necessity of this doctrine, to enable the Government properly to perform its high
functions.
In many localities in this country aside from the States which
have professedly renounced the National authority, it is notorious
that there are some evil-disposed persons in sympathy with the
enemies of the country, who are opposed to the war, and who
evince a spirit of hostility to the Government by hindering enlistments and volunteering-by enticing enlisted men to desert-in
secreting deserters-and resisting by force their arrest and return
to the army, and who by opposition to the draft and various other
modes of procceding are seeking to defeat the operations of the

IN RE JORDAN.

Government in conducting the war. It would be surprising if
such men could not find some convenient Judge who would issue
writs of habeas corpus, and by this process discharge all persons
brought before him, on the ground that the laws of Congress
authorizing enlistments, or the draft and the arrest of deserters,
and perhaps the war itself, was unconstitutional, and thus give the
color of law to their disloyal acts and proceedings.
It is no answer to this view that the Supreme Court of the
United States has finally decided in this case of Ableman vs.
Booth-the question still ii dispute in England and much discussed heretofore in this country-that a writ of error will lie to
the final decision and judgment in cases of habeas corpus. No
such writ or error to the Supreme Court of the United States
would lie except to the Court of last resort in the respective
States. The proceedings upon habeas corpus are summary. Upon
the decision of the Judge entertaining these proceedings, if it be
that the prisoner is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, it would
be ordered that he be discharged from such imprisonment. By
this process the army might be depleted by desertion, and the
deserters discharged by habeas corpus. Proceedings to reverse
such decision would be quite idle and useless for all practical purposes, for in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings several
years would elapse before the case could reach the Supreme Court
of the United States for review, and a reversal of the erroneous
decision of the Judge even by the Supreme Court of the State
could not be had in time to prevent the mischief.
Independently of their concurrence in the decision of Ableman
vs. Booth, Judge NELSON asserted the same doctrine in his charge
to the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court in the city of New York,
at the April Term, in 1851-vide Hurd, on Habeas Corpus, 198 and
199-and Judge McLEAN asserted the same doctrine in substance
in the case of Ninis vs. Newton, 5 McLean Rep. 92.
Since the decision in this case was made, and since most of the
foregoing was written, the August number of the American Law
Register has come to hand, containing the report of the case of
Jacob Spangler, p. 598, decided by the Supreme Court of Michi-
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gan, in which a writ of habeas corpus, issued to a Draft Commissioner in that State, was dismissed upon the same views herein
expressed, and in which the case of Ableman vs. Booth is cited
with approbation and followed.
Some inconvenience will undoubtedly result from the inability
of the State Judges to give relief in this class of cases. The State
Judges and local officers authorized to allow writs of habeas corpus
are more numerous than the United States Judges, and more
accessible ; and I doubt not if the officers acting under United
States authority were allowed to obey these writs by producing
the body and making a proper return thereto without raising this
question of jurisdiction, that it would rarely happen in this State,
at least, that. the State Judges would do anything needlessly to
embarrass the action of the General Government. I think the
Judges of this Court would unhesitatingly recognise their duty as
loyal citizens to support and maintain the Constitution of the
United States and the laws of Congress as the supreme law of the
land, with as much fidelity as though they were in fact acting
under the authority and commission of the General Government.
But while the difficulty of obtaining ready redress for this class
of grievances in the United States Courts may be, as it is, matter
of regret, this consideration cannot affect the question of law.
As the point is here distinctly made, and the officers of the General Government having the prisoners in custody refuse to produce
them in obedience to the writ, under instructions from the United
States authorities, there is no other course but to dismiss these
proceedings. But if it were doubtful whether the returns in these
cases were sufficient to oust me of jurisdiction, as such jurisdiction
could only be asserted by proceedings which would involve a conflict between the State and National Governments, I should be
quite unwilling, and should hardly think it my duty, to initiate
such proceedings at a time of great national peril, and when
the Government is struggling for existence with a gigantic re
hellion.
The attachments must be denied and the proceedings"
dismissed.

DE BARRY vs. WITHERS & PETERSON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DE BARRY VS. WITHERS & PETERSON.
An nccorr.modation acceptor having paid a bill for which no funds are provided by
the drawer, is entitled to recover the amount from him.
The suit must be in the name of the payee to the use of the acceptor.
But if the drawer make an express promise to the a~ceptor to pay the debt to him,
fie may sue in his own name.
Semble, that this is the general rule in the United States, but in England some
new consideration is required to enable the acceptor to sue in his own name.

The opinion of the Court was delivered, March 2d 1863, by
READ, J.-An accommodation acceptor having paid a bill for
which no funds are provided by the drawer, is entitled to recover
the amount from the drawer; for the law, in the absence of any
express contract, implies a contract to indemnify. But whether
the action be for money paid or specially for not indemnifying the
plaintiff, still it is only a chose in action which is assignable in
equity, and therefore the suit must be in the name of the assignor
for the use of the assignee. But as the assignee is the real owner,
it would seem but just if the debtor chooses expressly to promise
to the assignee to pay the debt to him, that the assignee might sustain an action against him, in his own name; and this was the view
taken in the early English cases of Fenner vs. Meares, 2 W. BL.
Rep. 1269, and Israel vs. Douglass, 1 H. Bl. Rep. 239. It would
seem, however, that in England the rule at present is to require
the consideration of forbearance, or some other new consideration,
to enable the assignee to proceed in his own name : 1 Chitty's Pl.
15; Addison on Contracts 984.
In America, however, the early English doctrine has beenadopted,
and this is clearly the sound rule, for it is a promise to pay to the
real owner of the debt, requiring no other consideration than the
fact that the debtor is morally and equitably bound to payit to his
actual creditor, and is not allowed to discharge himself by paying
it to any other person. This was the decision in Massachusetts, as
early as 1813, in Crocker vs. Whitney, 10 Mass. 316, and reaffirmed
in Mowry vs. Todd, 12 Id. 281. In Maryland, in Allston vs.

